Redefining What It Means to Be Charitable: Raising the Bar with a Public Benefit Requirement by Keb, Tiffany
  
[865] 
Comment 
TIFFANY KEB∗ 
Redefining What It Means to Be 
Charitable:  Raising the Bar with a 
Public Benefit Requirement 
n the United States, both the federal government and state 
governments have struggled with the problem of how to 
ensure that all charities receiving the advantage of tax 
exemptions are using them to provide a public benefit.  England 
and Wales recently attempted to solve this very problem by 
redefining what it means to be charitable in the Charities Act 
2006 (the “Charities Act”), which requires every charitable 
organization to have a charitable purpose and provide a public 
benefit.1  All organizations, including religious, educational, and 
poverty-relief charities, must demonstrate that they provide a 
public benefit at the time of registration and periodically 
throughout their existence in order to be classified as charitable.2  
Although the public benefit requirement existed before the 
Charities Act, this is the first time that religious, educational, 
and poverty-relief charities are affected by it; before the 
Charities Act these organizations benefited from a presumption 
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of a public benefit.  Enacting a similar public benefit 
requirement in America would provide objective evidence that 
charities are using their tax exemptions for a public benefit. 
While much discussion of reform has occurred at the federal 
level, thus far, little has been done.  However, several states have 
led the way in enacting reforms which are effectively public 
benefit requirements in response to the actions of nonprofit 
hospitals.3  Nonprofit hospitals are a perfect example of 
charitable organizations that may not be providing a sufficient 
public benefit; they have been criticized for being virtually 
indistinguishable from for-profit hospitals in the fees they charge 
for services and their aggressive collection policies.  These state 
reforms seek to eradicate such questionable practices of 
nonprofit hospitals by requiring them to provide a certain 
percentage of their gross income in charity care each year in 
order to remain exempt from state taxes.  The details of these 
reforms will be valuable in creating an effective public benefit 
requirement on the federal level because they provide a working 
example of how a public benefit requirement might function.  
Enacting a public benefit requirement in America similar to the 
one in the Charities Act would ensure that charitable 
organizations are returning the benefit of their tax exemptions to 
the public. 
This Comment seeks to explain how a public benefit 
requirement will improve the charitable sector in America.  Part 
I explains what it means to be “charitable” in American tax law, 
and provides a general idea of what an organization must do to 
be exempt from federal taxes under the Internal Revenue Code 
(“I.R.C.”) § 501(c)(3).  Part II describes the substantial benefits 
of being classified as a § 501(c)(3) organization.  Additionally, 
possible rationales for preferential treatment of charitable 
organizations in the tax code are explored.  Part III illustrates 
the need to reform current charity law, and explores what that 
restructuring might look like by examining reform occurring at 
the state level.  It also examines charity reform recently passed 
in England and Wales in the Charities Act, which potentially 
offers a creative solution to reforming the American charitable 
sector.  Part IV explores some of the concerns of government 
officials at the federal level regarding the charitable sector by 
 
3 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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summarizing a recent hearing before the House Committee on 
Ways and Means.  Finally, Part V argues for the adoption of a 
public benefit requirement similar to the one in the Charities 
Act.  Essentially, a public benefit requirement has already been 
adopted in several states, at least regarding the regulation of 
nonprofit hospitals.  The success of these states in formulating 
public benefit requirements is evidence that doing the same at 
the federal level will not be unduly burdensome. 
I 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE CHARITABLE IN AMERICA? 
Currently, to qualify as a charitable nonprofit, an organization 
must fit into one of the categories listed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).4  
Section 501(c)(3) extends tax exemption to “[c]orporations, and 
any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing 
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes.”5  While the 
meaning of most of the designations listed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
can generally be understood with common knowledge, 
“charitable” has two distinct definitions.6  The first is the popular 
definition, generally thought to be “relief of the poor”; the 
second is the legal definition.7  In 1956 proposed Treasury 
regulations were unsuccessful in limiting the legal definition of 
“charitable” to the popular definition.8  The legal definition 
ultimately adopted in Treasury regulations is substantially more 
broad then the popular definition9 and is greatly influenced by 
the legal definition previously adopted by England in 1601 in the 
 
4 E.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
349–50 (3d ed. 2006). 
5 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
6 For a thorough analysis of the confusion in defining “charitable” as it appears in 
§ 501(c)(3), see BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
106–11 (8th ed. 2003) (stating that Congress’s failure to indicate whether it intended 
the “popular and ordinary” or the common law definition of “charitable” in § 
501(c)(3) is responsible for much subsequent confusion). 
7 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 87. 
8 See id. at 356. 
9 Id. 
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Statute of Charitable Uses.10  In its legal sense, the definition of 
“charitable” has been explained as follows: 
The term charitable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally 
accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as 
limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of 
other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad 
outlines of charity as developed by judicial decisions.  Such 
term includes:  Relief of the poor and distressed or of the 
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of 
education or science; erection or maintenance of public 
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of 
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations 
designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to 
lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and 
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured 
by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile 
delinquency.11 
Congress has abstained from statutorily defining “charitable,” 
and in the absence of a statutory definition, the definition 
crafted by the Department of the Treasury and the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has been the accepted authority in 
interpreting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).12 
Additionally, there are some common law principles that add 
to the legal definition provided by Treasury regulations.  First, in 
order to be considered charitable, an organization’s activities 
must not violate a public policy doctrine.13  In Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Supreme Court held: 
[T]o warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must 
fall within a category specified in that section and must 
demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest.  
The institution’s purpose must not be so at odds with the 
common community conscience as to undermine any public 
benefit that might otherwise be conferred.
14
 
Further, there is a charitable class requirement which requires 
that “an organization be organized to benefit a sufficiently large 
 
10 See id. at 88–89.  The Statute of Charitable Uses, passed by the British 
Parliament in 1601, is generally thought to be the beginning of modern charity law.  
Id. at 88.  It sought to define categories of charitable uses, but these categories were 
not meant to be exclusive.  Id. at 89. 
11 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–(d)(2) (2007). 
12 See HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 110. 
13 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). 
14 Id. at 592 (footnote omitted). 
 2007]  Redefining What It Means to Be Charitable 869 
or indefinite class of people.”15  In addition, an organization 
must meet a community benefit requirement in order to be 
considered charitable.16  This means that an organization’s 
activities must benefit the community rather than just an 
individual.17  However, a limited number of people may be 
benefited if there is a community purpose; in these instances the 
benefited individuals are considered the “means” to a charitable 
end.18 
Finally, in order to be considered charitable an organization 
must be “both organized and operated exclusively19 for an 
exempt purpose.”20  To put it simply, the organizational test will 
be met as long as the purpose of the organization, as stated in 
the Articles of Organization, falls within I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).21  Of 
course, being organized for an exempt purpose is only the 
beginning of the inquiry; the organization must also meet the 
operational test.  The operational test requires that the 
organization’s actions are primarily in furtherance of an exempt 
purpose.22  If more than an insubstantial part of an 
organization’s activities are in furtherance of a nonexempt 
purpose, then the operational test will not be satisfied.23 
 
15 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 63 (Apr. 19, 2005), available at http://www 
.house.gov/jct/x-29-05.pdf. 
16 See HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 129. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Although § 501(c)(3) uses the word “exclusively,” the law treats “exclusively” 
to mean “primarily” rather than “solely.”  Id. at 76–77.  The primary purpose test 
will be satisfied if an organization operates primarily for its exempt purpose.  Id.  
For a more in-depth analysis of the primary purpose test, see id. at 76–82. 
20 Id. at 76.  The subtleties of organizational and operational tests are not 
discussed herein. 
21 See id. at 76–77.  For a detailed explanation of the organizational test, see id. at 
69–76. 
22 Id. at 82.  The operational test will not be satisfied if any of an organization’s 
net earnings inure to the benefit of private individuals or shareholders.  Id.  For 
additional information about the operational test, see id. at 82–87. 
23 Id. at 82. 
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II 
HOW AND WHY DOES THE TAX CODE TREAT CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS FAVORABLY? 
A.  The Benefit of Being Considered Charitable 
Once an organization has been granted exempt status under § 
501(c)(3) it will receive significant government benefits, 
predominantly in the form of special tax treatment.24  The 
privilege of receiving tax-deductible contributions for income, 
estate, and gift tax purposes25 is perhaps the most well-known 
benefit.  However, in addition to this benefit, charitable 
organizations may qualify to issue tax-exempt bonds,26 avoid 
federal unemployment taxes,27 and provide tax-deferred 
retirement plans for their employees.28  In addition to federal tax 
benefits, charitable organizations are generally eligible to receive 
tax benefits at the state level, although the benefits vary by 
jurisdiction.29  Alongside the many tax benefits are nontax 
benefits such as preferred postage rates and potential 
exemptions from regulatory regimes such as antitrust, securities, 
labor, and bankruptcy.30  There are several competing theories 
that attempt to explain the policy underlying the generous 
governmental benefits afforded charitable organizations.  These 
theories are discussed in detail below.  Although a consensus as 
to which theory best explains the preferential treatment of 
charitable organizations may never be reached, the debate 
matters because the prevailing accepted theories may have the 
power to guide the direction of any reform of the charitable 
sector.31 
B.  Rationales for Charitable Tax Exemption 
Four of the most well-known proposed rationales for 
charitable tax exemption are set forth below.  None of these 
 
24 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 327. 
25 See I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, 2522 (2006). 
26 See id. § 145. 
27 See id. § 3306(c)(8). 
28 See id. § 403(b). 
29 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 327. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. at 327–28. 
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theories has been accepted in any official way as the rationale 
behind charitable tax exemption, and it is likely that multiple 
rationales have contributed to favorable tax treatment of 
charitable organizations. 
1.  The Traditional Public Benefit Subsidy Theory 
The first rationale, public benefit subsidy theory, consists 
predominantly of the idea that charitable organizations provide 
beneficial public services that diminish the government’s burden 
to provide services that it may be unwilling or unable to 
provide.32  The theory’s advocates also articulate secondary 
reasons to justify the receipt of a public subsidy by charitable 
organizations.33  First, charitable organizations are thought to 
contribute to a pluralistic society, which goes hand-in-hand with 
America’s democratic ideals.34  Second, they may be able to 
provide goods and services more innovatively or efficiently than 
other sources.35  By providing a tax exemption to these 
organizations, the government is subsidizing these activities and 
their donors through “tax expenditures” rather than funding 
them directly.36  Courts and commentators frequently refer to 
the public benefit subsidy theory when they are questioned 
about the purpose behind providing charitable organizations tax-
exempt status.37  In 2005 the Joint Committee on Taxation 
reported on the reasons for tax exemption, saying that “[f]or 
some organizations, exemption from tax may be explained based 
on the nature of its activities.  For example, charitable activities 
or activities that provide a public benefit may be viewed as 
governmental in nature and therefore not appropriate subjects 
of taxation.”38 
One criticism of the traditional public subsidy theory is that 
the IRS offers no easily identifiable standard to explain how it 
decides what a public benefit is.39  In the absence of a 
 
32 Id. at 328. 
33 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities:  Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 402–03 (1997). 
34 See id. at 403. 
35 See id. 
36 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 328–29. 
37 Id. at 328. 
38 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 15, at 3. 
39 Atkinson, supra note 33, at 404–06. 
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successfully articulated standard, it may appear that the decision 
to label something a public benefit “is a matter of naked and 
unprincipled political preference.”40  Another criticism is that 
the charitable exemption applies to nonprofit organizations that 
seem to supply what are essentially private goods such as 
schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.41 
2.  Income Measurement Theory 
A second rationale, income measurement theory, justifies tax 
exemption for charitable organizations by appealing to basic 
principles of federal income tax.42  Therefore, unlike other 
theories, income measurement theory does not involve value 
judgments about charitable organizations.43  Under this theory, 
introduced by Professors Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, tax 
exemption is not a “special privilege” or a “hidden subsidy”; it is 
simply the appropriate result when tax principles are applied to 
organizations that do not seek a profit.44 
First, Bittker and Rahdert argue that taxing charitable 
nonprofits would be inappropriate because “computing their 
‘net income’ would be a conceptually difficult, if not self-
contradictory task.”45  They assert that aside from including 
endowment income in net income, it is unclear what else should 
be considered net income.46  Many other sources of income 
could potentially be classified under I.R.C. § 102 as tax-excluded 
gifts and bequests.47  For example, are membership dues gifts, or 
are they business income?48  Bittker and Rahdert suggest that a 
charitable organization could potentially be classified as a mere 
conduit that moves funds from donors to ultimate recipients with 
no tax consequences.49  Arguably, “[i]f an individual puts funds 
into a separate bank account to be used by him for charitable 
 
40 Id. at 405. 
41 Id. at 405–06. 
42 See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304–07 (1976). 
43 See id. at 333. 
44 Id. at 357–58. 
45 Id. at 307. 
46 Id. at 308. 
47 Id. at 308–09. 
48 Id. at 308. 
49 Id. at 309. 
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purposes, the deposit itself (as distinguished from the interest 
thereon) could hardly be regarded as creating income.”50 
Bittker and Rahdert point out that once the problem of 
determining net income is solved, the IRS will be forced to 
determine what kinds of deductions to allow.51  What are 
“ordinary and necessary business expenses” under I.R.C. § 162 
when the organization does not seek profits?52  In interpreting 
I.R.C. § 162, the IRS has been very clear that “expenditures not 
motivated by the desire for profit cannot be deducted as business 
expenses.”53  Is a charitable organization “an enterprise whose 
‘business’ is benevolence?”54  Bittker and Rahdert argue that if 
this were the case, and charitable organizations could deduct 
amounts expended to advance their charitable objectives, the 
result would be nearly the same as tax exemption because the 
organizations’ income would be irrevocably used for nonprofit 
purposes.55 
Even if all of the difficulties in computing the tax of a 
charitable organization were resolved, Bittker and Rahdert 
maintain that the challenge of setting an appropriate tax rate 
would remain a major issue.56  They argue that a charitable 
organization’s income should be imputed to the ultimate 
beneficiaries so it can be taxed at their personal rates because 
the economic burden will ultimately fall on them.57  However, 
beneficiaries will be for the most part unknown, so imputation of 
the organization’s income will likely be inaccurate.58  To correct 
this problem, Bittker and Rahdert suggest that Congress could 
forgo tax altogether, or tax the entity as a surrogate for its 
beneficiaries at the estimated rate that would likely be found if 
income could be imputed.59  Since recipients of gifts can exclude 
them from gross income under I.R.C. § 102, foregoing the tax 
altogether seems appropriate where the gift is simply passing 
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 310. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 311–12. 
56 Id. at 314. 
57 Id. at 315. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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through a conduit organization.60  Due to foreseeable 
inaccuracies in setting a tax rate, and the ultimate recipient’s 
exclusion of the service under § 102, Bittker and Rahdert 
maintain that the best option would be to refrain from taxing 
charitable organizations.61 
The income measurement theory has received criticism, most 
notably by Professor Henry Hansmann in his article The 
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Taxation, which sets out his theory of tax 
exemption, capital subsidy theory.  Hansmann argues that 
determining net income for tax purposes is not as difficult as 
Bittker and Rahdert make it out to be.62  He argues that 
“commercial nonprofits,” nonprofits that get most of their 
income from sales of goods or services, could easily be treated 
the same way as for-profit corporations.63  Further, Hansmann 
argues that “donative nonprofits,” nonprofits that get most of 
their funds from donations, also sell services; for example, he 
asserts that when donors contribute to the Red Cross, they are 
buying “disaster relief.”64  Therefore, calculating net income for 
donative nonprofits is similarly possible.65 
3.  Capital Subsidy Theory 
Professor Hansmann advocates a third rationale, capital 
subsidy theory.  Hansmann, relying on economic theory, argues 
that nonprofit corporations should be given a subsidy to 
compensate for the fact that they cannot earn capital effectively 
due to the nondistribution constraint placed on them.66  He 
argues that a subsidy can promote efficiency in the market 
because nonprofit corporations generally exist to solve the 
problem of “contract failure,” providing goods or services where 
 
60 Id. at 316. 
61 See id. at 315–16. 
62 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58–59 (1981). 
63 Id. at 59. 
64 Id. at 60–61. 
65 Id. at 62. 
66 Id. at 72.  The nondistribution constraint requires nonprofit corporations to use 
all earnings for exempt purposes rather than distributing them to officers, members, 
etc.  Id. at 56–57. 
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for-profit corporations cannot do so effectively.67  Specifically, 
“contract failure” occurs when “ordinary market competition 
may be insufficient to police the performance of for-profit firms, 
thus leaving them free to charge excessive prices for inferior 
service.”68  Rather than risk paying excessive prices, consumers 
turn to nonprofit corporations, which are generally thought to be 
less profit driven and more trustworthy than for-profit 
corporations due to the nondistribution constraint on profits.69 
Ideally, before tax-exempt status is granted to nonprofits, two 
economic conditions should be satisfied: 
(1) [N]onprofit firms must be more efficient producers of the 
service than are for-profit firms; and (2) the nonprofit firms in 
the industry must not have expanded to the point at which the 
productivity of the capital they employ has fallen below the 
before-tax rate of return being earned on capital in other 
industries.
70
 
However, Hansmann argues that it is not realistic to expect the 
Department of the Treasury to make these determinations.71  He 
believes that the current method of determining tax exemption 
does a reasonably good job of making these determinations, 
although the method is somewhat crude.72 
One criticism of Hansmann’s theory is that his model suggests 
that nonprofits which exist because they are the most efficient 
providers of a service will eventually take over the industries 
they participate in, and the exemption does nothing more than 
accelerate this domination.73  In some cases, however, the 
reverse may be true:  the exemption may do economic damage 
by propping up inefficient nonprofits that would not otherwise 
be able to compete with efficient for-profits.74 
 
67 See id. at 69. 
68 Id.  Ordinary market competition may be insufficient because consumers 
experience difficulty in “(1) comparing the quality of performance offered by 
competing providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after a purchase 
is made, whether the service was actually performed as promised.”  Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 86. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 86–87. 
73 Atkinson, supra note 33, at 427–28. 
74 Id. at 428. 
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4.  Donative Theory 
Finally, the donative theory of tax exemption, first introduced 
by Professors Mark Hall and John Colombo, essentially argues 
that “donative institutions deserve a tax subsidy because the 
willingness of the public to contribute demonstrates both 
worthiness and neediness.”75  Worthiness and neediness are the 
two distinct components of “deservedness,” which Hall and 
Colombo argue is “[t]he most important criterion for evaluating 
a theory of charitable tax exemption.”76  Hall and Colombo 
assert that by choosing to donate to an organization, the donor 
communicates that the organization has “special worth” and is 
therefore deserving of a subsidy.77  They argue that need for a 
subsidy is exhibited when the organization solicits donations.78  
Donations will likely never fulfill the organization’s needs 
because without a quid pro quo return on a donation, the free 
rider problem will ensure that charitable gifts will never 
financially reflect the value that the donor actually believes the 
organization’s services have.79  Therefore, Hall and Colombo 
argue that when a charitable organization receives donative 
support, it can safely be assumed that the donations reflect only 
a fraction of how much the public values the organization, and it 
follows that an organization with substantial donative support is 
worthy of a subsidy to fill that gap.80 
Once deservedness has been shown, Hall and Colombo 
believe that a subsidy ideally should be given in proportion to 
deservedness.81  Unfortunately the tax exemption system cannot 
accurately accomplish this task, and it is questionable whether it 
is really a subsidy system at all.  However, due to the problem of 
 
75 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax 
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1385 (1991). 
76 Id. at 1384. 
77 See id. at 1385. 
78 See id. 
79 Id.  The free rider problem occurs when people can benefit from a public good 
without contributing their fair share to support it.  DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD 
R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS:  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 753 (2002).  
There is no incentive for free riders to contribute to the public good, so they rely on 
others to pay for it.  Id.  Free riders are a problem because the providers of public 
goods depend on receiving contributions that reflect the true value individuals place 
on their services in order to achieve optimum output.  See id. at 753–54. 
80 Hall & Colombo, supra note 75, at 1385. 
81 Id. at 1385–86. 
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government failure, Hall and Colombo argue that there is no 
better system.82  They assert that substantial philanthropy will 
only occur when neither private markets nor the government can 
provide a shared social benefit effectively, and this “political 
stalemate” renders an implicit subsidy through tax exemption 
the best option.83 
Hall and Colombo argue that donative theory is able to 
explain most or all benefits charitable organizations receive, 
from deductible contributions under I.R.C. § 170 to exemption 
from state property tax, while Bittker and Rahdert’s income 
measurement theory and Henry Hansmann’s capital subsidy 
theory are unable to account for all charitable benefits.84  
Further, Hall and Colombo argue that donative theory fits nicely 
with the historical understanding of “charitable” while income 
measurement theory and capital subsidy theory do not.85 
One criticism of donative theory is that Hall and Colombo’s 
insistence that an organization get, on average, at least one-third 
of its support through donations in order to receive tax 
exemption would potentially prevent many organizations that 
rely predominantly on fees, or are heavily endowed, from 
receiving exemptions.86 
III 
ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE DEFINITION OF CHARITABLE 
A.  State Reform 
As mentioned above, in the midst of changing economic 
circumstances there may be a need to reevaluate some 
traditionally exempt entities to determine if they continue to be 
appropriate objects of tax exemption.  A prominent, often 
discussed example is the healthcare industry, which has changed 
substantially in the last forty years due to the introduction of 
Medicare and Medicaid and an increase in employer-provided 
and private insurance.87  Recent statistics reveal that nonprofit 
 
82 Id. at 1386. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 1386–87. 
85 See id. at 1387. 
86 Atkinson, supra note 33, at 422. 
87 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 357.  For more information about 
the controversy surrounding nonprofit hospitals, see generally Robert Charles 
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hospitals, like for-profit hospitals, receive almost all of their 
revenue (ninety-two percent) from the sale of goods and 
services, and few of those sales are at subsidized prices to those 
who cannot pay.88  The House Committee on Ways and Means 
has expressed concern over the state of nonprofit hospitals, but 
there has been no move toward reform.  Although significant 
changes in the definition of charitable as applied to healthcare 
have not yet occurred on the federal level, some states are 
recognizing the need to reform the definition of charitable as it 
applies to hospitals.  Within the last ten to twenty years several 
states such as Illinois, Utah, Texas, and Pennsylvania have 
enacted stricter guidelines that hospitals must meet in order to 
remain exempt from state taxes.89 
Utah was one of the first states to enact stricter standards for 
exemption of nonprofit hospitals, and many states reconsidered 
their own tax exemption policies after Utah denied property tax 
exemption to two nonprofit hospitals in Utah County ex rel. 
County Board of Equalization v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc.90  In Intermountain Health Care, the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized that the Utah Constitution requires an entity to 
provide a gift to the community in order to receive a property 
tax exemption.91  According to the court, a gift to the community 
is either “a substantial imbalance in the exchange between the 
charity and the recipient of its services” or “the lessening of a 
government burden through the charity’s operation.”92  The 
concept of a gift should not be confused with the concept of a 
 
Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 
(1980); Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary 
Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1015 (1988). 
88 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 109th Cong. 53 (2005) [hereinafter Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector] 
(statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Ph.D., Director, Congressional Budget Office). 
89 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 372–73.  Hospitals and other 
“charitable” entities receive federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3), but 
exemption from state income, sales, and property tax is decided at the state level.  
John D. Colombo, Hospital Property Tax Exemption in Illinois:  Exploring the 
Policy Gaps, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 494–95 (2006).  Therefore, an entity may be 
considered a nonprofit for tax purposes at the federal level, but not at the state 
level. 
90 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 373. 
91 Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 269. 
92 Id. 
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community benefit.93  For-profit enterprises, like nonprofit 
enterprises, provide a community benefit by providing 
healthcare, but the measure of a gift is not the entity’s usefulness 
to the community; rather, the measure is whether the entity’s 
contribution is nonreciprocal.94  The court found that there was 
no “substantial imbalance” between the value of the services 
provided and the payment received.95  The two hospitals in the 
case gave away less than one percent of gross revenue in charity 
care, did not advertise the charity care, and always attempted to 
recover payment for the charitable services.96  Further, the 
hospitals collected remuneration from government programs, 
private insurance, and individuals for almost all services 
provided.97  The court also held that the hospitals did not lessen 
the burden on the government because they refused services to 
indigent patients and generated a surplus of money from their 
operations.98  Because the hospitals were not “passing along the 
benefit of the exemption” to the public by charging less for 
services than for-profits, they were not lessening the burden on 
the government; in fact, it could be argued that Utah’s for-profit 
hospitals were lessening the government’s burden more 
efficiently than nonprofit hospitals because they were providing 
the same services without public subsidies.99  After this case, the 
Utah Tax Commission enhanced the gift requirement, which, as 
mentioned above, requires “a substantial imbalance in the 
exchange between the charity and the recipient of its services” or 
“the lessening of a government burden through the charity’s 
operation,”100 by mandating that the gift must be quantifiable 
and exceed the value of the property tax exemption.101 
 
93 See id. at 276–77. 
94 See id. 
95 Id. at 274. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. at 277–78.  Even if the hospitals used the surplus to expand their 
services, there was no evidence that the money was set aside for use only in Utah 
because its owners operated facilities throughout many states.  Id. at 275.  
Regardless, by charging the same as for-profit entities, these hospitals were 
expanding at the expense of those they were created to serve.  See id. at 278. 
99 See id. 
100 Id. at 269. 
101 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 373; PROPERTY TAX DIV., UTAH 
STATE TAX COMM’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE:  STANDARD 2–PROPERTY TAX 
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Similarly, Illinois has seen abundant movement for reform in 
the healthcare industry.102  First, the Illinois Attorney General, 
Lisa Madigan, proposed that nonprofit hospitals in Illinois be 
required to spend at least eight percent of their total operating 
costs on charity care to retain state tax exemptions.103  The 
Illinois General Assembly introduced the proposal as H.B. 5000, 
and if it passes, it will force Illinois nonprofit hospitals, which 
generally spend less than one percent of their revenue on charity 
care, to spend at least eight percent of their total operating costs 
on charity care, and also guarantee free or discounted service to 
low-income patients.104  Second, several notable Illinois cases 
have revoked tax-exempt status from hospitals.105  Most recently, 
on February 13, 2004, the Champaign County Board of Review 
found Provena Covenant Medical Center unfit for exemption.106  
“Provena had made headlines in [Illinois] by pursuing an 
aggressive collection policy, suing and even making civil arrests 
of people who did not pay the hospital’s bills.”107  Additionally, 
 
EXEMPTIONS 35 (June 2007), available at http://propertytax.utah.gov/standards/ 
standard02.pdf. 
102 For a thorough explanation and analysis of Illinois’s regulation of tax 
exemption of the healthcare industry, see Colombo, supra note 89, at 505–09. 
103 Elizabeth Schwinn, Tax Watch:  Hospitals Oppose Plan to Require Charity 
Care, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 9, 2006, at 29.  The federal test for 
exempting healthcare providers does not require any specific amount of charity 
care.  See Colombo, supra note 89, at 498.  Rather, an exempt provider must “have 
a community board, treat Medicare and Medicaid patients along with all privately 
insured patients . . . and engage in some other significant community ‘plus’ such as 
community outreach programs, health education, health research, and/or charity 
care.”  Id. 
104 Schwinn, supra note 103, at 29. 
105 See, e.g., Riverside Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 361, 366–67 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) (finding that Riverside was not eligible for a charitable exemption 
from property tax because the clinics were not used primarily for charitable 
purposes and that writing off bad debts was not considered charitable:  Riverside 
billed all its patients for services, did not advertise a charity care program, and did 
not provide any precare screening program to determine whether a patient should 
be a charity patient); Alivio Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 702 N.E.2d 189, 191–93 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that Alivio did not qualify for charitable exemption 
because Alivio did not waive fees regardless of inability to pay, did not advertise 
charity care, and that simply writing off bad debts is not enough to be considered a 
charitable purpose). 
106 See Lucette Lagnado, Hospital Found ‘Not Charitable’ Loses Its Status as Tax 
Exempt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B1. 
107 Elizabeth Schwinn, Tax Watch:  Hospital Loses State Tax Exemption, CHRON. 
OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 4, 2004, at 34.  The Board cited a case “in which the 
hospital charged a former fast-food worker $34,500 for outpatient kidney-stone 
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Provena spent less than one percent of its revenue on charity 
care108 and used for-profit companies to accomplish important 
hospital functions.109  Provena has appealed the Champaign 
County Board of Review’s decision, but thus far the state has 
upheld the ruling.110  According to Provena, the ruling has cost it 
$4.8 million in property taxes thus far.111 
While Utah and Illinois have been at the forefront of reform 
of nonprofit hospitals, states such as Pennsylvania and Texas 
have also taken action by enacting statutes requiring nonprofit 
hospitals to provide a certain percentage of charity care in order 
to remain tax-exempt.112 
What can we learn from the reform of tax exemption 
standards enacted at the state level?113  Arguably, the reforms 
initiated at the state level reflect a need for reassessment of the 
process of tax-exemption on the federal level.  If states no longer 
consider these organizations charitable enough to deserve 
exemption from state taxes, then more than likely these 
organizations should not be privileged with exemption from 
federal taxes.114  States may be better able to assess the current 
status of charitable entities because they are responsible for the 
oversight of only the entities in their states, while the federal 
government is theoretically responsible for oversight of all 
nonprofit entities.  Unfortunately, the federal government does 
 
removal.”  Id.  When the patient was unable to pay, Provena tried to garnish his 
retirement savings.  Id.  The debt was only forgiven after press inquiry.  Id. 
108 See Elizabeth Schwinn, Illinois Hospital Appeals Property-Tax Decision, 
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 9, 2006, at 16. 
109 Lagnado, supra note 106. 
110 Schwinn, supra note 108, at 16. 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., 10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 375 (West 1999); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 
11.1801(a) (Vernon 2001). 
113 Of course, some states are reforming their tax exemption standards for fiscal 
reasons.  However, even if a prominent consideration in enacting reform is 
financial, protecting the underlying purpose of the tax exemption is likely still a 
primary concern.  This Comment will not analyze states’ financial concerns. 
114 State reform alone is not enough to prevent less than charitable organizations 
from receiving exemptions.  Even if all fifty states enact successful reforms, the 
organizations found not to qualify for exemption at the state level may still qualify 
for exemption under federal tax law.  Whether an organization is exempt from 
federal taxes is a separate question from whether the organization is exempt from 
state taxes.  One determination does not affect the other.  For an overview of state 
and local tax exemptions, see FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 470–76. 
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not seem to have the resources to review tax-exempt 
organizations as thoroughly or as frequently as it would like and 
therefore may be slow to recognize the need for change or how 
to make that change.  Former IRS Commissioner Sheldon 
Cohen expressed concern to the House Committee on Ways and 
Means that the IRS does not have adequate personnel for the 
appropriate oversight of tax-exempt entities.115  In fact, the IRS 
examines tax-exempt entities at a rate far below that of for-profit 
entities.116  Therefore, reform at the state level is a valuable tool 
for assessing what reform needs to be made at the federal level, 
and what it might look like. 
Congress has recognized that a change needs to be made 
regarding the regulation of nonprofit entities, but thus far it has 
not settled on what that change should be.  A more robust 
system is needed to ensure that organizations receiving federal 
tax exemptions are indeed charitable.  In addition to state 
reforms, innovative legislation recently enacted in England and 
Wales, which will require charities to demonstrate that they 
provide a public benefit, might provide guidance on how to 
reform federal law. 
B.  Charities Act 2006 
On November 8, 2006, after “three years, three Queen’s 
Speeches and 80 hours of debate to get the Charities Bill 
through Parliament,”117 England and Wales substantially 
reformed their charitable sector by passing the Charities Act 
2006.118  The Charities Act, which is “perhaps . . . one of the most 
debated Acts in history,”119 addresses a fundamental issue:  what 
 
115 See Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 88, at 69–71 (statement of 
Sheldon S. Cohen, Partner, Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, and Comm’r, Internal 
Revenue Serv., 1965–69). 
116 Id. at 7–8 (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office). 
117 Stephen Cook, The Charities Act:  Charity Law Finally Enters the Modern 
Age, THIRD SECTOR, Nov. 22, 2006, http://thirdsector.co.uk/News/620297/Charities-
Act-Charity-law-finally-enters-modern-age/. 
118 An Act for All:  The New Charities Act, CHARITY COMMISSION NEWS 
(Charity Comm’n Direct, Liverpool, Eng.), Autumn 2006, at 2, 2 [hereinafter An 
Act for All], available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/tcc/pdfs/ 
ccnews25.pdf. 
119 STEWARDSHIP, CHARITIES ACT 2006 EXPLAINED 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.stewardship.org.uk/documents/charities_act_2006.pdf. 
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is charity?120  The passage of the Charities Act was a result of a 
report commissioned by the Prime Minister in 2001 outlining the 
strengths and weaknesses of the law and regulatory framework 
of the nonprofit sector and providing recommendations for 
improvements.121  The report emphasized the importance of 
ensuring that the benefits of charitable status go to charities that 
provide a benefit to the public, and recommended that the 
public benefit test be applied more consistently.122  The 
government sought public review of the recommendations 
before accepting any of them, and the majority of 
governmentally accepted recommendations are codified in the 
Charities Act.123 
The Times called the Charities Act the first major legislative 
reform of the definition of charity since the Statute of Charitable 
Uses in 1601,124 which is often considered the first statutory 
definition of charitable purposes.125  Prior to the Charities Act, 
charitable purposes were developed solely through case law.126  
The Charities Act defines a charity as a body or trust that is for a 
charitable purpose and for the public benefit.127  It expands the 
 
120 See Stephen Lloyd, What Does ‘Charity’ Mean?, TIMES (London), Dec. 12, 
2006, at LAW 2.  Of course, the Charities Act 2006 enacts many other changes in 
the nonprofit sector that will not be discussed in this Comment.  For a 
comprehensive overview of the Charities Act 2006, see generally OFFICE OF PUB. 
SECTOR INFO., THE NAT’L ARCHIVES, CHARITIES ACT 2006 EXPLANATORY 
NOTES (2006), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2006/ukpgaen_20060050 
_en.pdf [hereinafter CHARITIES ACT NOTES]. 
121 CHARITIES ACT NOTES, supra note 120, at 3. 
122 See STRATEGY UNIT, CABINET OFFICE, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT:  
A REVIEW OF THE CHARITIES AND THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR 40 
(2002), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/~/media/ 
assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/strat%20data%20pdf.ashx. 
123 CHARITIES ACT NOTES, supra note 120, at 3–4.  For the results of the public 
consultation and to view recommendations accepted by the government, see HOME 
OFFICE, CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS:  A MODERN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
(July 2003), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third_sector/law_and 
_regulation/charities_act_2006/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third 
_sector/charitiesnotforprofit_eng%20pdf.ashx. 
124 See Lloyd, supra note 120. 
125 CHARITIES ACT NOTES, supra note 120, at 4.  Technically, the four charitable 
purposes set forth in the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 were not statutory law 
because they were in the preamble rather than the body of the statute.  Id.  
Nonetheless, this list of charitable purposes, mentioned above as the four accepted 
categories of charitable purposes, formed the foundation of charity law.  Id. 
126 See Lloyd, supra note 120. 
127 An Act for All, supra note 118, at 2. 
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four accepted categories of charitable purposes, “the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of 
religion and other purposes beneficial to the community,” to 
thirteen.128  Once an organization satisfies the requirement of 
fitting into a charitable category, it must demonstrate that it 
exists for a public benefit in order to be considered charitable.129  
Previously, unless evidence to the contrary existed, religious, 
educational, and poverty-relief charities were presumed to exist 
for a public benefit.130  Because charities existing outside of these 
categories did not receive the benefit of this presumption, some 
thought it appropriate to withdraw the presumption and level 
the playing field.131  Under the Charities Act, every charity–
including religious, educational, and poverty relief charities–
will have to show that it provides a public benefit when 
 
128 Cook, supra note 117.  The thirteen charitable purposes are as follows: 
  (a) the prevention or relief of poverty; 
  (b) the advancement of education; 
  (c) the advancement of religion; 
  (d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives; 
  (e) the advancement of citizenship or community development; 
  (f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science; 
  (g) the advancement of amateur sport; 
 (h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation,  or  
  the promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity; 
  (i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement; 
  (j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability,  
   financial hardship or other disadvantage; 
  (k) the advancement of animal welfare; 
  (l) the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or  
   the efficiency of the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services; 
  (m) any other purposes . . .  
    . . . .  
    . . . recognized as charitable purposes under existing charity law . . . ; any 
   purposes that may reasonably be  regarded as analogous to, or within the 
   spirit of, any purposes falling within [this Act]; and any purposes that may 
   reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any 
   purposes which have been recognized as under  charity law [after the new 
   law comes into force]. 
Charities Act 2006, c. 50, §§ 2(2)(a)–(m), 4(a)–(c) (Eng.). 
129 Charities Act 2006–A Guide to the Main Provisions Which Affect Charities, 
CHARITY COMM’N, Nov. 2006, http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/spr/ 
ca2006prov.asp#1. 
130 Cook, supra note 117. 
131 STEWARDSHIP, supra note 119, at 7. 
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registering.132  Furthermore, the burden of demonstrating a 
public benefit will not only be on new charities; existing charities 
will also be under rolling review by the Charity Commission133 to 
ensure that they are providing a public benefit.134 
Currently, the major remaining issues are first, what is public 
benefit; and second, how it can be demonstrated.  “Public 
benefit” is not defined in the Charities Act; instead, the Charities 
Act gives the Charity Commission the objective of issuing 
guidance based on common-law standards to promote 
understanding of the public benefit requirement.135  However, 
despite this guidance, the legal definition of public benefit will 
continue to be settled by common law; guidance provided by the 
Charity Commission will not be legally binding on charity 
trustees, although such guidance must be taken into 
consideration when it is relevant.136 
The Charity Commission has promised that in terms of what 
will be required to fulfill the public benefit requirement, “[o]ne 
size won’t fit all, and public benefit will look different for 
different groups of charities.”137  The Charity Commission 
provides general guidance about the public benefit 
requirement.138  This guidance sets forth five main principles of 
the requirement: 
 
132 Cook, supra note 117.  Prior to the Charities Act 2006, only organizations that 
were not religious, educational, or poverty-relief charities had to provide evidence 
that their purpose was a public benefit.  CHARITIES ACT NOTES, supra note 120, at 
5–6. 
133 The Charities Act establishes the Charity Commission “as a body independent 
of Government Ministers and Departments but responsible to the Crown.”  
STEWARDSHIP, supra note 119, at 11.  It has six functions under the Charities Act.  
Id.  A few of the Charity Commission’s functions include:  (1) “[d]etermining 
whether institutions are or are not charities,” (2) “[e]ncouraging and facilitating the 
better administration of charities,” (3) “[i]nvestigating misconduct or 
mismanagement of charities and taking appropriate action to protect charities,” and 
(4) “[d]isseminating information in relation to the Commissions [sic] objectives or 
functions.”  Id. 
134 Cook, supra note 117. 
135 See STEWARDSHIP, supra note 119, at 6. 
136 Id. at 10. 
137 An Act for All, supra note 118, at 2. 
138 See CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENG. & WALES, PUBLIC BENEFIT–THE LEGAL 
PRINCIPALS, at pt. 3 (2005), http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/spr/pblp.asp 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2008). 
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i. There must be an identifiable benefit, but this can take 
 many different forms. 
ii. Benefit is assessed in the light of modern conditions. 
iii. The benefit must be to the public at large, or to a sufficient 
 section of the public. 
iv. Any private benefit must be incidental. 
v. Those who are less well off must not be entirely excluded 
 from benefit.
139
 
The Charity Commission also provides that when demonstrating 
a public benefit, any tangible benefits should generally be 
presented before intangible benefits.140  Tangible benefits are 
usually measurable, and where they exist, a benefit will likely be 
obvious.141  However, if an organization provides only intangible 
benefits, they will suffice where the public benefit is clear, even 
though it may not be measurable.142 
Although the Charity Commission has not yet issued official 
guidance about demonstrating a public benefit, it has created a 
tentative timetable regarding the creation and release of such 
guidance.  In January 2007, the Commission will begin a three-
month consultation to explore “principles of public benefit,” 
how charities might demonstrate public benefit, and how this 
process might be assessed.143  The next step of the process on the 
timetable, scheduled for March 2007, is the Commission’s 
analysis of the responses from the consultation.144  In March 2007 
the Commission will also begin talking to charity subsectors 
about application of the principles.145  The Committee will then 
publish the principles of public benefit and begin a pilot 
assessment of public benefit, producing specific guidance for 
 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at pt. 9. 
141 Id. at pts. 7–8.  “For example, if a charity relieves a person’s sickness or 
financial hardship, the person’s health or financial circumstances are measurably 
improved.”  Id. at pt. 8. 
142 Id. at pt. 9.  Examples of intangible benefits include things like “benefits of 
education, or the appreciation of a historic building or a beautiful landscape.”  Id.  
When determining whether something is an intangible benefit, the Charity 
Commission, court, or tribunal will consider the “general consensus of fair-minded 
and unprejudiced opinion,” but public belief alone cannot determine what is 
charitable.  Id. 
143 Indicative Programme:  Taking Forward Public Benefit, http://www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/library/spr/pdfs/timetable.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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various types of charities in the process.146  After the Committee 
publishes results of the pilot assessment, it will begin formal 
assessment, and by summer 2008 it will report progress to 
Parliament.147 
Some commentators have expressed concern regarding the 
revocation of the presumption of a public benefit from religious, 
educational, and poverty-relief charities.  “Religious charities 
and fee-charging charities, such as private hospitals and schools, 
have expressed [the] most concern” about the new public benefit 
requirement.148 
Religious charities are concerned that their benefit to the 
public is intangible and therefore not easily demonstrated.149  
During debate of the bill there was some assurance “that 
removing the presumption . . . is not intended to lead to a 
narrowing down of the range of religious activities that are 
considered charitable.”150  However, at the end of the debate it 
remained unclear how the public benefit of prayer could and 
would be demonstrated.151  Some members mentioned the 
possibility of using existing objective studies, such as one 
intended to analyze the affect of prayer on the health of patients 
going into surgery.152  However, reliance on an objective study 
may not be necessary.  During the debate, Edward Miliband 
pointed out that: 
Religion has an important role to play in society through faith 
and worship, motivating charitable giving and contributing in 
other ways to stronger communities.  Both those dimensions 
will thus usually be apparent from the doctrines, beliefs and 
practices of a religion.  The Charity Commission is clear that 
most established religions should not have any difficulty in 
demonstrating their value to society from their beliefs.
153
 
The House of Commons debate also focused on how the 
public benefit requirement would affect private schools.  In a 
briefing, the Charity Commission emphasized that an indirect 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Cook, supra note 117. 
149 STEWARDSHIP, supra note 119, at 8. 
150 See id. at 9–10. 
151 See 450 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 1583. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at col. 1609. 
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benefit such as savings in public expenditures on education likely 
will not meet the public benefit requirements.154  Schools must 
provide direct benefits that extend beyond a narrow class of 
people.155  In the House of Commons debate, members of 
Parliament expressed that the intention behind leaving the 
public benefit requirement to be defined by the Charity 
Commission was to avoid creating a rigid, unwavering standard, 
thus allowing standards to be tailored to fit the realities of 
various nonprofit organizations.156  Therefore, hypothetically, an 
urban school may be expected to provide different benefits to 
the public than a rural school.157 
The expanded public benefit requirement guidelines will not 
be finalized or routinely in effect until early 2008,158 so 
measuring the success of this innovative method of regulating 
charitable organizations will not be possible for some time.  
However, there is assurance of a formal review within three 
years of the requirement’s enactment, because such a 
commitment was made during the passage of the Charities 
Bill.159  Further, the Charities Act will be reviewed in its entirety 
within five years of its passage and its impact will be reported to 
Parliament.160 
Even though the expanded public benefit requirement has not 
yet been implemented, as mentioned above, a public benefit 
requirement was in use before the Charities Act in a more 
limited scope, so it therefore is not entirely experimental.  The 
government chose to expand the public benefit requirement only 
after evaluating its usefulness.161  Further, the requirement seems 
to have public support.  A poll showed that eighty-eight percent 
of those asked, including ninety-five percent of those eighteen to 
twenty-four years old, thought that “a registered charity should 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 STEWARDSHIP, supra note 119, at 11. 
159 OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, CABINET OFFICE, CHARITIES ACT 2006:  
UPDATED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 5 (2007), available at http://www.cabinetoffice 
.gov.uk/third_sector/law_and_regulation/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
third_sector/charities_act_2006_updated_implementation_plan%20pdf.ashx. 
160 Id. 
161 See STRATEGY UNIT, supra note 122, at 39–40. 
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be able to demonstrate that its activities provide a benefit to 
society.”162  The presence of data suggesting that the public 
benefit requirement has been a success in the past is useful in 
predicting its future success.  Therefore, the public benefit 
requirement, though not yet fully implemented in its expanded 
form, is a useful model for American legislators to study when 
reforming the charitable sector. 
IV 
DISCONTENT WITH THE CHARITABLE SECTOR AT THE 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
In April 2005 the House Committee on Ways and Means 
conducted a comprehensive overview of the tax-exempt sector.163  
Chairman Bill Thomas argued that the hearing was especially 
important because nearly two decades had passed since the last 
comprehensive hearing, and revenue from the tax-exempt sector 
had grown from $3 billion in 1975 to $1.2 trillion in 2001.164  The 
stated goal of the hearing was not to discuss specific proposals 
for reform, but to develop a good foundation of knowledge 
regarding “the concept, the theory, and the practice of charity 
and tax exemption.”165  Much of the discussion focused on the 
need to clarify the tax code with regard to exempt organizations 
and the need to increase oversight of the nonprofit sector.166  
One specific goal of the hearing was to determine what makes 
tax-exempt organizations–whose goods and services are nearly 
identical to those of the for-profit sector–deserving of their 
exempt status.167 
In his address to the Committee, Professor John Colombo 
pointed out that the operation of some charities, such as 
nonprofit hospitals, has changed greatly over the years.168  He 
argued that these charities, as they are currently run, may no 
 
162 Id. at 39. 
163 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector, supra note 88, at 1. 
164 Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Bill Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means). 
165 Id. at 6. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 4. 
168 Id. at 58 (statement of John D. Colombo, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, 
Urbana-Champaign, Ill.). 
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longer be providing a public benefit, and that they therefore are 
not deserving of tax-exempt status.169  Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office, suggested that 
entities that no longer provide a public benefit continue to 
receive exemptions because “[t]here is an attempt to apply a 
bright-line exemption to entities when it is, in fact, activities that 
are either public purpose or charitable in nature, and these 
entities have a great mixture of activities within them and it 
would be useful to distinguish between those two things.”170  
Advocating for better oversight of tax-exempt organizations, 
Professor Francis Hill argued that although “exemption depends 
upon providing a public benefit to a defined class of 
beneficiaries,” Congress’s oversight thus far had been ineffective 
in guaranteeing that a public benefit was provided and instead 
focused on preventing private benefit.171  She argued, “The idea 
of preventing impermissible private benefits is important, but 
preventing these impermissible private benefits will not in itself 
assure that exempt entities operate for a public benefit, and that 
is what I am urging the Committee to focus on as its work goes 
forward.”172 
There was a consensus among the speakers that federal tax 
law was unclear and full of gaps concerning the law of tax-
exempt organizations.  Bruce Hopkins suggested that Congress 
should lay the framework for the law of exempt organizations, 
and that the IRS could provide “meaningful guidance.”173  On 
the topic of improving federal tax law, former IRS 
Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen suggested that in order to 
relieve the IRS Commissioner from wearing two hats, “one to 
encourage and move charity forward and the other one to 
restrict it and audit it,” the Committee on Ways and Means 
should consider following England’s system of creating and 
enforcing charitable rules.174  England has one body to write the 
 
169 See id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 61 (statement of Francis R. Hill, Professor, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, 
Coral Gables, Fla.). 
172 Id. at 61–62. 
173 Id. at 78–79 (statement of Bruce R. Hopkins, Att’y, Polsinelli Shalton Welte 
Suelthaus, P.C., Kansas City, Mo.). 
174 Id. at 70 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, Partner, Morgan, Lewis and 
Bockius, and Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., 1965–69). 
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charitable rules and encourage charity, the Charities 
Commission, and enforcement is left to England Revenue.175  
Cohen’s proposal was initially given to the Committee on Ways 
and Means in the seventies, but it did not receive support.176 
The discussion at the hearing suggests that change is needed 
in the laws regulating the charitable sector.  As the laws 
currently operate, they may not be providing adequate 
regulation of charitable organizations.  In the absence of 
adequate regulation, nonprofits that are no longer providing a 
public benefit will continue to reap the advantages of tax 
exemption at the expense of taxpayers. 
V 
REDEFINING THE MEANING OF CHARITABLE:  A SUGGESTION 
FOR REFORM 
As Professor Hill argued before the Committee on Ways and 
Means, a central problem in the current regulation of charitable 
nonprofits is the emphasis on preventing a private benefit rather 
than assuring the provision of a public benefit.  Of course, the 
problem is that preventing a private benefit does not assure that 
there is public benefit.  For example, a nonprofit hospital may 
not be guilty of private inurement or benefit, and still charge fees 
for services similar to those charged at for-profit hospitals and 
provide limited charity care.  Where is the public benefit?  If 
there is no public benefit, then the only thing setting a nonprofit 
apart from a for-profit is the nondistribution constraint.  
Therefore, verifying that charitable organizations are providing 
an acceptable public benefit is just as important as confirming 
that they are not guilty of private inurement. 
Implementing a public benefit requirement similar to the one 
included in the Charities Act is a viable option for assuring that 
charitable organizations are actually providing a public benefit.  
One minor issue is that the Charities Act is in its infancy, and the 
public benefit requirement likely will not be in full force until 
2008, so at this time there are no reports of its success or failure.  
It is undeniable that monitoring how this requirement unfolds in 
England and Wales, and more specifically how the Charity 
 
175 Id. 
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Commission sets up the standards for demonstration of a public 
benefit to accommodate various charitable entities, will be 
beneficial to successful implementation of a similar requirement 
in America.  However, even without empirical data from the 
new public benefit requirement’s operation in England and 
Wales, there is reason to believe that such a requirement will 
work in America.  It should be noted that even before the 
Charities Act, all charitable organizations in England and Wales, 
aside from religious, educational, and poverty-relief charities, 
were abiding by the public benefit requirement.  As mentioned 
above, before going forward with the Charities Act, the 
government put together a report analyzing the state of the 
current public benefit requirement alongside other charitable 
sector laws and invited public comment.  The provisions of the 
Charities Act were a result of this report and public opinion of 
the ideas in the report.  Therefore, considering that the public 
benefit requirement was expanded only after careful review of 
its role in charitable sector law and public opinion of that role, 
there is reason to believe that it is a workable requirement that 
could be successful in America. 
Further, several states have already implemented what are 
essentially public benefit requirements that hospitals must meet 
in order to remain exempt from various state taxes.  These states 
require hospitals to spend a certain percentage of their gross 
income on charity care, effectively creating a public benefit 
requirement.  Utah’s constitution actually incorporates a public 
benefit requirement, although it is not referred to as such.  As 
mentioned above, Utah requires organizations to provide a gift 
to the community in order to be exempt from property tax.  The 
gift is either “a substantial imbalance in the exchange between 
the charity and the recipient of its services” or “the lessening of a 
government burden through the charity’s operation.”177  If a 
public benefit requirement can be enforced successfully in 
several states for charities providing tangible benefits, then 
surely it can be enacted at the federal level for charities 
providing tangible benefits. 
The more difficult issue is determining how charities that 
provide intangible benefits will demonstrate a public benefit.  As 
 
177 Utah County ex rel. County Bd. of Equalization v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 269 (Utah 1985). 
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mentioned above, the general rule provided by the Charity 
Commission is to look at tangible benefits first, and if there are 
none, to look at intangible benefits where the public benefit is 
clear.  The Charity Commission’s position has been that 
although they are more difficult to measure, intangible benefits, 
like the value of art, are discernable, and the “general consensus 
of fair-minded and unprejudiced opinion” will be considered in 
making this type of judgment.178  Generally, charitable 
organizations will be able to provide some type of tangible 
benefit, and where that is not possible, a public benefit will likely 
be obvious. 
The adoption of a public benefit requirement will likely 
change little about the exemption process for charitable 
organizations providing intangible benefits; they will probably 
just have to describe their public benefit.  However, 
organizations providing tangible benefits will have to carefully 
account for the public benefit they offer using measurable 
criteria.  Therefore, enacting a public benefit requirement will 
ensure that fee-charging nonprofits like hospitals pass the 
benefit of exemption to the public.  Criticism of the nonprofit 
sector by Congress and others has focused on fee-charging 
nonprofits whose services seem indistinguishable from those of 
for-profits.  The public benefit requirement will solve this 
problem by demanding measurable criteria that differentiate 
charitable organizations from for-profit organizations.  As the 
Chair of the Charity Commission argued, “Charities are 
precious, and play a vital and unique role at the heart of our 
society, but like all bodies in which the public places its trust, 
they should be accountable to everyone for what they do.”179 
 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has clearly stated that some type of reform of the 
charitable sector must take place to ensure that nonprofits are 
still deserving of tax exemption at the federal level.  Adopting a 
public benefit requirement modeled on the one in the Charities 
 
178 CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENG. & WALES, supra note 138, at pt. 9. 
179 Suzi Leather, Letter to the Editor, Charities Should Be Accountable to 
Everyone for What They Do, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 2007, at 16 (Suzi 
Leather is Chair of the Charity Commission). 
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Act will force charities to provide objective proof, where it is 
possible, that they are indeed providing a public benefit. 
 
